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IN

1981, FUELED by soaring divorce rates and increasing burdens on
court resources, California took the lead in the exodus from traditional adversarial proceedings when it became the first state to mandate mediation of custody and visitation disputes.' Since then, nearly
every state has followed in California's footsteps by implementing
some form of mediation for domestic disputes, 2 although California
remains in a small minority of states that mandates mediation. 3 Most
significantly, it is the only state that will not, under any circumstance,
exempt victims of domestic violence from the requirement to medi* Class of 2004. The author would like to thank Professor Jay Folberg for providing
insight and contributions, and Sherry Murphy for her invaluable assistance in editing this
Comment. The author would also like to thank Jean Dunnigan and Greg Buhagiar for
their ulwavering love and support. This comment is dedicated to the late Peter Dunnigan
and Joseph Dunnigan, in appreciation of the indelible footprints that they left.
1. See JOAN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 101-02
(1985); Hugh McIsaac, Mandatory Conciliation Custody/Visitation Matters: California's Bold
Stroke, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 152, 152 (Howard Davidson
et al. eds., 1982).
2. See infra pp. 5-6 and note 30. See generally Carrie-Anne Tondo et al., Note, Mediation Trends: A Survey of the States, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 431 (2001) (listing state mediation laws as
of 2001).
3. California is one of only eleven states that mandate mediation. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3170 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 711A (1999); DEL. FAM. CT.

C.P.R. 16; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West 1998); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (Supp. 2001);
HAW. FAM. CT. R. 94(a); IDAHO Civ. P.R. 16(j); Ky. CT. R. 1 & 509; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A § 251 (West 1998); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3.475 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5013.1(b)-(c) (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.3 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-56
(Michie 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202(3) (b) (Michie 2001).
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ate. 4 At the same time that this official retreat from the public forum
took shape, the battered women's movement of the 1970s had only

recently begun to gain public exposure and legitimacy, prompting responses to the traditionally private problem of domestic violence. 5 Although the movement created awareness of this age-old epidemic and
spurred the genesis of important legal and social reforms, 6 the scope

and complexity of domestic violence is still only beginning to be fully
understood. 7 Yet, the pervasiveness of this problem is frighteningly
well documented, with nearly one out of three women reporting phys-

ical or sexual abuse by a husband or boyfriend at some point in their
lives."
In California, the intersection of mandatory mediation with domestic violence poses significant dangers on two levels. On a societal
level, California's requirement that victims of domestic violence mediate with their abusers has placed a hurdle in the battered women's

movement by reprivatizing domestic violence, impeding the progress
that is driven by public discourse and scrutiny. On an individual level,
mandatory mediation leaves victims in a disadvantageous position,
fending for themselves at a bargaining table that fails to promote the
safety and welfare of victims and their children. California has not
4. See statutes and court rules cited supra note 3.
5. See generally MARG1 LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
43-46 (1995) (outlining the chronology of legal and social responses to domestic violence); DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK:

EVERYTHING YOU

NEED TrO KNOW 18-21 (1995) (discussing the history of domestic violence and corresponding legal and social changes).
6. See Andre R. Imbrogno, Using ADR to Address Issues of Public Concern: Can ADR
Become an Instrument for Social Oppression?, 14 Oio ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 855, 856 (1999)
("Until recently, domestic abuse was a hidden, private type of violence ....[T]he problem
of battering and the social and legal construct of the 'battered woman' did not exist in this
country until the women's movement identified it.").
7. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1047-53 (1991). "Researchers have only recently
begun to explore the sociological and psychological dimensions of the domestic violence
problem. Until twenty years ago, woman abuse was neither publicly studied nor acknowledged." Id. at 1047.
8. See NAT'L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE INFORMATION FOR STUDENTS AND GENERAL PUBIC: NATIONAL STATISTICS, at http://
www.ndvh.org/dvlnfo.html#stats (last accessed Aug. 9, 2003). This comment uses feminine
pronouns to describe victims of abuse and male pronouns to describe perpetrators of
abuse because most domestic violence is committed by men against women. See Christine
Wicker, The Seriousness of Female Violence Against Men Has Been Exaggerated, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 34, 38 (Tamara L. Roleff ed., 2000) (reporting that according
to the Department of Justice, women are victims of domestic violence eleven times more
often than men); see also MCCUE, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that between 91 and 95% of
domestic abuse involves men hurting women).
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only taken the power of the adversary system out of victims' hands, but
it has simultaneously failed to provide commensurate safeguards in
the mediation process to protect and empower victims. While most
other states have recognized and addressed these implications in various ways, California stands alone in its refusal to initiate the appropriate modifications.
This comment seeks to expose and offer solutions to the prevailing problems of domestic violence and current mediation legislation.
California's mandatory mediation systematically disadvantages battered women and their children because it undermines the principles
that effective and fair mediation depend upon: it allows the batterer
to capitalize upon the psychological ailments of the victim, it increases
the risk of danger for the victim and the children, it stifles the progress begun by the battered women's movement, and it ultimately fails
to empower victims and hold batterers accountable. Part I of this comment will introduce the foundational basis and current application of
mediation, and the scope and dimensions of domestic violence. Part
II will address the various problems in California's system of
mandatory mediation. Part III will focus on solutions for restructuring
California's existing legislation in a way that empowers, protects, and
improves the precarious position of battered women and their
children.
I.

Background

A.

Mediation

1. The Development and Theory of Mediation
As a means of dispute resolution, the practice of mediation has
existed for centuries across different cultures, peoples, and institutions. 9 In the New Testament, Paul advocated the use of mediation by
encouraging the Corinthians to utilize people of their own community to resolve disputes instead of going to court. 1° Mediation was the
primary means of dispute resolution in Ancient China, and has also

9. See Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation: An Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 3-4 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds.,
1988).
10. See 1 Corinthians6:1-6:4.
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been used in Africa.'' In the history of the United States, the early
12
Quakers practiced mediation for their marital disputes.
While the roots of mediation have been planted for ages, it was
not until the twentieth century that the practice of mediation in the
context of divorce began to significantly evolve. In 1939, California
began to offer court-connected conciliation services, originally intended to provide marriage counseling in order to reconcile
spouses. ' 3 Major increases in divorce rates eventually created a shift in
focus towards visitation and custody mediation.' 4 In 1953, the divorce
rate in California produced an average of 3.6 divorces per thousand
population, and by 1978 it had almost doubled to a rate of over 6.2
per thousand.' 5 In response, during the early 1970s several courts in
California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin began utilizing Conciliation
Courts for custody counseling in certain contested family cases as an
alternative to the adversary system.16 During this time, divorce mediation was gaining in popularity. California developed nationally recognized mediation programs for custody and visitation disputes, and
many counties found that mediation saved money for both the court
17
and the couples involved.
. Finally, in 1981, California became the first state to require mediation of custody and visitation disputes.' 8 Proposed in 1979 and enacted on January 1, 1981, California Senate Bill 961 mandated
mediation for couples settling custody and visitation matters.', The
bill was pending for nearly three years, and its passage was based
largely on the notion that mediation was more efficient and cost-effec2
tive than litigation.
While California's trailblazing actions placed the ancient art of
mediation on an elevated plane and transformed couples' dissolution
experiences, the implications of this move on domestic violence were
11.

See Milne & Folberg, supra note 9, at 4; Ann L. Milne, Mediation or Therapy-Which

Is It?, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 1, 4 (James C. Hansen & Sarah Childs Grebe eds.,

1985).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Milne & Folberg, supra note 9, at 4.
See id. at 5.
See Mclsaac, supra note 1, at 152.
See id.
See lsolina Ricci, Court-Based Mandatory Mediation: Special Considerations, in MEDIATING FAMILY AND DIVORCE DISPUTES: CURRENT PRACI-CES AND APPLICATIONS (Jay Folberg et al.
eds.) (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 3, on file with Jay Folberg).
17. See BLADES, supra note 1, at 102.
18.

See id. at 101.

19.
20.

See S. 961, 1979-80 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979), 1980 Cal. Stat. 4607.
See BLADES, supra note 1, at 103.
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yet to be realized. To understand the resulting relationship, it is first
necessary to examine the nature of divorce mediation.
Divorce mediation is defined as a "non-therapeutic process by
which the parties together, with the assistance of a neutral resource
person or persons, attempt to systematically isolate points of agreement and disagreement, explore alternatives and consider compromises for the purpose of reaching a consensual settlement of issues
relating to their divorce or separation." 2 1 Mediation is valued for empowering the parties by giving them the responsibility to make choices
about their own lives. 22 The related aspect of voluntariness is at the
"heart of the meditation process," because parties who reach their
own resolution tend to be more satisfied and more likely to abide by
their agreement. 23 Mediation is also deemed "fundamentally a process
of assisted negotiation," 24 and an acceptable outcome of mediation is
premised upon the parties having equal bargaining power so that they
are each able to advocate their positions effectively. 2 5 The mediator's
purported role is both a neutral facilitator of communication between
27
the parties 2 6 and a balancer of power between them.
Mediation advocates agree that confidentiality in the process is
critical in order to ensure that the paities speak freely, thus creating
an atmosphere of trust necessary to mediate successfully. 28 This aura

of openness and trust hinges both on the confidentiality and neutrality of the mediator, allowing the parties to engage fully in the process
without fearing that the mediator is taking sides or that the informa29
tion will later be able to be' used against the parties.

21.
H. Jay Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
FAMiLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11, 13 (Howard Davidson et al. eds., 1982).

22. See id.
23. ALAN ScoTr RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
338 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
24.

RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

Kathleen W. Marcel & Patrick Wiseman, VWy We Teach Law Students to Mediate,J.

DisP. RESOL.

77, 84 (1987).

25. See Lisa G. Lerman, Stopping Domestic Violence: A Guide for Mediators, in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 429, 432 (Howard Davidson et al. eds., 1982).
26.

See RAU ET AL., supra note 23, at 338.

27.

See id. at 405.
See id. at 461; see alsoJay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce Mediation, in
DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 319, 319 Gay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988)
(discussing the importance of confidentiality to promote openness and trust and ensure
effective mediation).
28.

29.

See Folberg, supra note 28, at 319.
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Current Application of Mediation in Domestic Disputes

Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have legislation
regulating family mediation, and of those, California is one of only
eleven states that uniformly order mandatory mediation."" While most
state mediation programs are discretionary and provide exemptions
to mediation, California is the only state that utilizes mandatory medi31
ation without any exemptions.
States vary as to what is required for an exemption to mediation.
In Colorado, where mediation is at the court's discretion, the court
cannot send parties to mediation when one of the parties claims to
have been the victim of physical or psychological abuse. 32 Florida's
mandatory mediation is prohibited if the court finds there has been a
history of domestic violence that would compromise the mediation
process. 33 In North Carolina, where mediation is mandatory on issues
involving custody or visitation,3 4 mediation may be waived for good
cause, which includes allegations of abuse, neglect, and substance
35
abuse.
While most states refuse to force parties into mediation when
there are mere allegations of domestic abuse, California prohibits
30. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (Michie 2002);
ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.01-.24 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12322 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAm. CODE § 3170 (West 1994 & Snpp. 2002); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-22-311 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-53 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 711A (1999); DEL. FAM. Cr. C.P.R. 16(b); U.S. DiST. CT. R. D.C., App. C II; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 44.102 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (Supp. 2001); HAW.
FAM. CT. R. 94(a); IDAHO CIV. P.R. 16(j); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/404 (West 1999); ILL.
FAM. LAW. P. 11, 18; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-9.4-1 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41
(West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-602, 23-604 (1995 & Supp. 2002); Ky. CT. R. 1, 3, 509;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:332, 9:363 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Lit. 19-A, § 251 (West
1998); MD. PUB. GEN. LAWS R. 9-205; MICH. CT. R. 3.216; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West
1990 & Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2906, 432909 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 3.475 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1992 &
Supp. 2002); N.J. CT. R. 1:40-5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5 (Michie 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1997); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.25,
2919.25 (Anderson 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.3 (2001 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.755 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(39) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); S.C. CT. R. 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 254-56 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-131 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(5) (1998); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.4 (Michie 2000); WAsHi. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-9-202 (Michie 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

See statutes and court rules cited supra note 30.
See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311(1).
See FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 44.102(c).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b).
See id. § 50-13.1(c).
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such a complete exemption. Instead, California allows the mediator to
meet with the parties separately at the request of the party alleging
domestic violence. 36 Additionally, an abused person can bring along a
"support person" or attorney during mediation, but the mediator has
37
the authority to exclude them.

California outlines the purposes of mediation:
(a) To reduce acrimony that may exist between the parties.
(b) To develop an agreement assuring the child close and continuing contact with both parents that is in the best interest of the child
(c) To effect a settlement on the issue of visitation
rights of all
38
parties that is in the best interest of the child.
Although the purposes of mediation are clearly focused on reaching a
settlement that reflects the best interest of the children and alleviates
conflict between the parties, these goals are not effectively achieved
under California's current system of mandatory mediation. Given California's general legislative scheme and the guiding principles central
to effective mediation, the ideological and practical problems that
arise are apparent once the nature of domestic violence is
understood.
B.

Domestic Violence and Its Effects

Although domestic violence against women is "as old as recorded
history," it took hundreds of years for it to be treated as a crime.3 9 In
ancient Roman times a man was allowed to kill his wife. 40 American
courts in the 1800s allowed a man to beat his wife, and followed the
"rule of thumb," whereby a husband could beat his wife with any stick
as long as it was no thicker than his own thumb. 4 1 It was not until the
latter half of the twentieth century that society awakened to the problem of domestic violence and responded with protective laws and programs. 42 Yet, domestic abuse has not subsided, and as it is increasingly
36.

See Cal. Fam. Code § 3181 ("(a) In a proceeding in which mediation is re-

quired ...

where there has been a history of domestic violence between the parties ...

at

the request of the party alleging domestic violence ... the mediator appointed pursuant to
this chapter shall meet with the parties separately and at separate times.").
37. Id. § 3182 ("(a) The mediator has authority to exclude counsel from participation
in the mediation proceedings ... if, in the mediator's discretion, exclusion of counsel is
appropriate or necessary. (b) The mediator has authority to exclude a domestic violence
support person from a mediation proceeding .
).

38. Id. § 3161 (a)-(c).
40.
41.

39.

supra note 5, at 15.
See id.
See id. at 16.

42.

See id. at 19-27; McCuE, supra note 5, at 25-58.
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studied and reported, statistics reveal its pervasiveness. A woman is
beaten every 15 seconds in the United States. 4 3 For about one out of
five abused women the violence is not an isolated incident, but a repeated occurrence.

44

.

Furthermore, statistics show that the violence increases when women leave their abusers. According to one study of domestic homicides, 75% of the victims had ended or stated an intention to end the
relationship at the time of their death. 45 While these statistics expose
the surface of domestic violence, the depth of its complexity and the
scope of its impact are even more troubling.
Domestic violence is commonly defined as "the emotional, physical, psychological, or sexual abuse perpetrated against a person by
that person's spouse, former spouse, partner, former partner or by the
other parent of a minor child. '4 6 "Battering," though used interchangeably with domestic violence, is more specifically understood as
"power and control marked by violence and coercion. '47 A "battered
woman" is "a woman who experiences the violence against her as determining or controlling her thoughts, emotions, or actions, including her efforts to cope with the violence itself.' 4

Similarly, some

scholars describe the patterns of an abusive relationship as a "culture
of battering."44 The "culture of battering" includes three primary elements: the abuse itself (physical, emotional, sexual, etc.); the systematic pattern of domination and control the batterer exerts over his
victim; and the coping strategies, including hiding, denying and minimizing the abuse, which a battered woman employs to reduce the psy5
chological impact of the abuse.

0

In researching the detrimental physical and psychological effects
on women in abusive relationships, psychologist Lenore Walker iden43. See Lori Heise, The Global War Against Women, WA'sH. POST, Apr. 9, 1989, at BI.
44. See MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMIV 41-42 (1980).
45. See OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NEW YORK STATE, DATA
SHEET, at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/about-dv/dataweb2003.pdf (last accessed Aug. 9,
2003).
46. MCCUE, supra note 5, at 2.
47. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICii. L. REV. 1, 93 (1991).
48.

Id.

49. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2141 (1993).
50.

Id.
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tified a "cycle of violence,"'' 5 which describes three stages in an abusive
relationship. 52 The first stage is the "tension building stage," which
includes verbal abuse, threats, and minor battering. 53 Women react
compliantly and try to calm the batterer down during this stage, with
the goal of anticipating his every need and wish in order to prevent
the incidents from escalating. 54 Nevertheless, stage two, "the acute
battering incident," is inevitable and is characterized by brief but uncontrollable battering. 55 The second phase is shorter than the first
and third phases; usually it will last from two to twenty-four hours, but
some women have reported it to last for a week or more. 56 This is
followed by the third stage of "kindness and contrite loving behavior,"
where the abuser realizes he has gone too far and attempts to compensate by treating his victim kindly and lovingly. 57 Finally, the cycle

comes full circle when there is a slow buildup of tension again as the
batterer thinks his victim is getting too free, and he uses minor bat58
tering to bring her back under his control.
Extensive research on the negative effects created by this cycle of
violence sheds light on to the psychological characteristics of battered
women.59 Victims of domestic violence are found to have poor self-

images and feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, and helplessness."0 Battered women also commonly have strong feelings of fear,
shame, and self-blame. 6' This often prevents them from calling the
police or from otherwise finding help. 62 The National Coalition
51. It should be noted that the "cycle of violence" is compatible with the "culture of
battering" discussion supra text accompanying notes 49-50. See Fischer et al. supra note 49,
at 2141 (discussing how the gaps in time caused by the cyclical nature of battering allow
women to contribute to the culture of battering by minimizing the violence).
52.

See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 60 (1979). Although the dominant

theory, Walker's description of three stages in the "cycle of violence" is not the exclusive
pattern of abusive behavior found in battering relationships. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208-10 (1993) ("The violence may appear to come 'out of the
blue,' with no tension-building phase, or there may be no contrition phase following the
violence, only the transient absence of violence and abuse.").
53.

WALKER, supra note 52, at 56-59.

54. See id. at 56.
55. Id. at 59.
56. See id. at 60.
57. Id. at 65.
58. See id. at 69.
59. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 52, at 1215-27 (discussing the battered woman's psychological reactions to domestic violence).
60. See RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 131 (1988).
61. See id. at 131-32.
62. See id.
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Against Domestic Violence estimates that up to 90% of battered women never report their abuse. 63 Often they minimize or deny their
abuse altogether, failing to identify themselves as battered by citing a
lack of physical abuse or examples of women who have been more
severely abused. 64 In addition, battered women can be reluctant to
65
show the extent of the problem.
Walker explains that battered women are characterized by
"learned helplessness, ' 66 suffering from extreme feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. 67 They feel unable to protect themselves, or
to control or influence what will happen to them.68 Walker describes
that even after a period of such helplessness, a woman is often still
paralyzed and unable to act on her own. 69 Another commentator
confirms:
[R]epeated assault can unquestionably cause severe psychological
distress or dysfunction; major depressive, sexual and dissociative
disorders; cognitive changes in how one views oneself and understands the world .... [T]he individual's normal coping mechanisms are replaced by adaptive responses designed to manage the
feeling that all avenues of escape are closed ("learned helplessness") and the unbearable anxiety that accompanies repeated
vio70
lation of one's physical and psychological boundaries.
The particular psychological and physical disposition of women
escaping from a battering relationship places them at a disadvantageous and dangerous seat at the mediation bargaining table. Given
the context of domestic violence and the nature of mediation, California's mandatory mediation laws pose the following significant ideological and practical problems.

63. See BERRY, supra note 5, at 6.
64. See Fischer et al., supra note 49, at 2140-41.
65. See Carol Nadelson & Maria Sauzier, Intervention Irogramsfor Individual Victims and
Their Families, in VIOLENCE IN THE HOME: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 153, 157 (Mary
Lystad ed., 1986).
66. WALKER, supra note 52, at 174. But see Cahn, supra note 7, at 1049-53 (pointing out
that the learned helplessness theory does not always conform to every battered woman's
experience).
67. See WALKER, supra note 52, at 174; GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 60, at 131, 142-43.
68. See WALKER, supra note 52, at 174; GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 60, at 131, 142-43.
69. See WALKER, supra note 52, at 174.
70. Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 997 (1995).
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II.

Problems

A.

Mandatory Mediation Involving Domestic Violence Undermines
the Principles and Goals of Mediation

Effective mediation is premised upon voluntary participation,
equal bargaining power, and confidentiality. However, these principles, along with the premise of mediation as a self-determining and
empowering process, are undermined in the context of mandatory
mediation involving domestic violence.
1. Voluntariness
The element of voluntariness, thought to be at the heart of mediation, is absent when parties are forced to mediate. The belief that,
due to the voluntary nature of their participation, the parties are
more likely to invest emotionally in the success of their personally formulated agreements is not applicable if the parties are forced to mediate. 71 Furthermore, while proponents of mediation highlight its value
as "emphasi[zing] individual freedom and minimum state coercion,"72 mandating mediation effectively negates individual freedom
because it is by definition a forced measure the state imposes.
These problems take on more significance and have a much
greater detrimental impact when the state is forcing a victim of domestic violence to mediate because it reinforces her lack of power and
lack of control, which have already been beaten into her. By taking
away any ability she might have to empower herself through the judicial process, the state has not only decreased her chances of success,
but has also effectively replaced her husband as the unchallenged and
all-controlling patriarch. The state prevents the battered woman from
regaining a sense of power and self-determination, and instead, forces
her into a process it labels "self-determining." Thus, California harms
the victim of domestic violence by reinforcing her disempowerment as
it traps her into the contradictions of forced participation in
mediation.
2.

Equal Bargaining Power

More problematic, however, is the premise of effective mediation
based upon parties with equal bargaining power fairly negotiating
with each other. Commentators have recognized that as an alternative
71.
72.

See Folberg, supra note 21, at 18.
Id.
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to the adversarial system, mediation "lacks the precise and perfected
checks and balances that are the principal benefit of the adversary
process," and thus, "mediation creates a constant risk of overreaching
and dominance by the more knowledgeable, powerful or less emotional party."73 This risk is at its greatest in situations with domestic
violence victims because there is a small chance of fair negotiations
given the profoundly unequal power equation, the victim's disadvantageous psychological characteristics, and the threat of the batterer's retaliation. The nature of the abusive relationship is characterized by
the batterer's total control and position of power used to dominate
the victim. So at the outset, mediation for abused spouses is operating
in severe contravention of a crucial premise of mediation, because an
abusive relationship is one in which the victim has been systematically
stripped of power by the batterer.
California's legislation attempts to recognize and ameliorate the
problem of power imbalances by announcing certain standards of mediation practice. The standards include, "[t] he conducting of negotiations in such a way as to equalize power relationships between the
parties. ' 74 However, there are no guidelines as to how this can be accomplished. In addition, although a mediator might be successful in
balancing out the slight power differences of a non-abusive couple, it
is unlikely that after years of abuse and psychological damage, the mediator will be able to undo the lasting effects of the fundamental
power imbalance that exists in a battering relationship.
For example, if the batterer bullies or intimidates the victim, it
may coerce her into agreeing to terms she does not want. Even if
there are no outright threats or noticeable intimidation on the part of
the batterer that the neutral mediator may observe, the victim's emotional status and pattern of acquiescing to the abuser reinforce the
likelihood that she will feel reluctant to state her needs or assert herself forcefully. Moreover, she may realistically fear some sort of retri75
bution or retaliation.
Thus, although the mediator must be trained in issues of domestic violence according to California law,7 6 there is still an enormous
risk that negotiations will favor the abuser due to the victim's deepseeded fears of his potential for revenge and her ingrained feelings of
helplessness and powerlessness. As one account of battered women
73.

Id. at 20-2 1.

74.
75.
76.

CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 3162(b) (3) (West 1994 & Supp. 2002).

See discussion infra Part II.B.
See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1815-1816, 3164.

Summer 20031

MEDIATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS

explains, "These women were a study in paralyzing terror ... the waking lives of these women were characterized by overwhelming passivity
and inability to act ....

They had a pervasive sense of hopelessness

and despair about themselves and their lives." 77 To expect battered
women to walk right into mediation without fear, overcome all their
existing psychological torment and assertively state their case, ignores
the scope of damage domestic violence inflicts.
B.

The Batterer's Psychological Advantage: The Victim's Fear and
Denial Are Not Assuaged by Separate Meetings

A battered woman has significant fears, including the fear of re78
venge by her partner and the fear that he will take the children.
Taking into consideration her perspective of powerlessness and the
reticent, accommodating stance she has adopted through the cycle of
violence, coupled with her fears of retaliation and kidnapping, it is
likely that mediation negotiations will indirectly coerce a battered woman into a less desirable agreement. Research has affirmed the power
and advantage the batterer continues to exert during mediation. A
study found that men won custody in 63% of "agreement" cases, and
in many of those cases the father had forced the mother to agree by
threatening her safety, reputation, or financial security. 79 As one researcher noted, "Clearly, men can continue to control and abuse
'their' women by gaining control of the children."8 0
Although California refuses to exempt a victim of domestic violence from mediation, the legislation does seek to offset these
problems by providing for separate meetings for the parties.8 According to the California Rules of Court, these separate sessions "must protect the confidentiality of each party's times of arrival, departure, and

77. Elaine Hilberman, Overview: The "Wife-Beater's Wife" Reconsidered, 137:11 AM. J
PSYCHOL. 1337, 1341-42 (1980).
78. See Amy Kohlberg, Social and Legal Policy Implications of Domestic Violence, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 445, 465 (Howard Davidson et al. eds.,
1982); cf Mahoney, supra note 47, at 65-69 (defining "separation assault" as when the
batterer "seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to
return .... It is an attempt to gain, retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish
the woman for ending the relationship.").
79. See LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 233-34 (1985).
80. Id.
81. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3181.
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meeting with Family Court Services."8 2 Separate meetings may provide
for the battered woman's immediate safety and offset some pressure
and coercion she might feel in the direct presence of the batterer, but
the victim's fears of retaliation and kidnapping, and her reluctance to
assert her wishes cannot be expected to dissipate suddenly once she is
out of the abuser's presence. California's belief that separate meetings
can realistically alleviate the problems of accommodation, fear, coercion, and lack of power and control, is like trying to argue that a victim of domestic violence no longer fears her batterer when he leaves
the house.
Even though separate meetings may alleviate the direct threat to
safety, they fail to eliminate the psychological weapons that advantage
the batterer in a negotiation process. As one researcher stresses, "It's
vital to understand that battering is not a series of isolated blow-ups. It
is a process of deliberateintimidationintended to coerce the victim to do the will

of the victimizer."8 3 Moreover, Lenore Walker's research emphasizes the
pervasive nature of both physical and psychological coercion, which
cannot be separated, and notes that battered women often found the
psychological abuse more harmful than the physical. 4 Walker adds
that threats of violence to the battered women's families are commonplace, and states, "The woman really believed that her batterer would
commit such violence." 85 In addition, research has found that after
they escape, battered women experience a host of psychological
problems ranging from anxiety, shame, and despair, to flashbacks and
suicidal ideation.8 6 Moreover, "[t]hese aftershocks are the symptoms
of post-traumatic stress disorder, a psychological syndrome seen also
87
in survivors of rape and incest and in veterans of wartime combat."
However, "the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, as it is now
defined, doesn't begin to cover the problems of battered women." '8
Thus, it is a misguided notion to assume that a batterer's psychological control over a victim simply disappears when he does. Whether
she is in the presence of him directly or not, all her psychological
stresses, fears, and patterns of accommodating behavior naturally per82. CAL. R. CT. 5.215(d) (6); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(b) (West Supp. 2002)
(requiring the Judicial Council to adopt guidelines for Family Court Services to follow in
domestic violence cases).
83. ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & How TO STOP IT 88 (1994).
84. See WALKER, supra note 52, at xiv.
85.

Id. at 148.

86.

SeeJONES, supra

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 88.

note 83, at 87.
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sist. Although separate meetings are a minor benefit, they do not significantly alter her disadvantaged position as a battered woman. She
may not be looking at her batterer in the face or hearing his voice, but
as the mediator communicates the batterer's demands to her in a separate room, nothing stops her from picturing his face and remembering his oft-repeated threats, which have been burned oppressively into
her psyche.
Furthermore, there is a significant risk of the victim's denial that
she is abused. The separate meetings may not take place immediately,
or at all, if the battered woman never alleges domestic violence. Section 3181 of California's mandatory mediation provisions provides
that if there is a history of domestic violence between the parties or if
a party alleges domestic violence on the intake form, the mediator
shall meet with parties separately if the party alleging violence so requests.8 9 In addition, California Rules of Court provide that each
court should screen for a history of domestic violence in accordance
with the Family Court Services program. 90 However, this "screening"
can be satisfied simply by using the intake form. 9 1 Furthermore, it is
not mandatory that the intake form or other court file be reviewed
92
before the start of mediation.
Once a battered woman is given the intake form, questionnaire,
or other source of screening device, there is a high risk that she will
not allege domestic violence. Many women minimize their experiences of domestic violence, and do not consider themselves victims of
abuse.9 3 Therefore they will not readily identify themselves as victims
94
of domestic violence.
Another serious problem is that a woman may fear retaliation by
the abuser, especially given the fact that the act of leaving an abusive
relationship is often followed by an increase in violence.9 5 One study
found that 45% of murders of women were caused by the man's reaction to an estrangement. 9 6 Even assuming that separate meetings were
a satisfactory means of ensuring the battered woman's chances of a
89. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3181 (West 1994).
90. See CAL. R. CT. 5.215(f) (1).
91. Id. R. 5.215(f) (2).
92. See id. R. 5.215(e)(3).
93. See generally Fischer et al., supra note 49, at 2139-41 (discussing victim's minimization and denial of abuse).
94. See id.
95. See MCCUE, supra note 5, at 115; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 64-65.
96. See DONALD G. DUTrON, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 15 (1995). Researchers drew from police records and coronors' reports and examined 551 recorded
murders of females in the Province of Ontario from 1974 to 1990. See id. at 187 n.7.
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fair outcome, there must be comprehensive measures in place to guarantee that the separate meetings will take place before mediation
begins.
A victim of domestic violence is burdened with realistic fears of
revenge, retaliation, and kidnapping, which she carries with her long
after she has been physically separated from her abuser. In addition, a
victim's reluctance to identify herself as a battered woman, coupled
with the inadequacy of California's screening procedures and separate
meetings, allows a batterer to retain a psychological advantage over
the victim in making an "agreement" with her. This advantage unfairly
favors the batterer's success in mediation because he will negotiate
with an enormous amount of psychological control as his invisible bargaining chip.
C.

The Problem of Confidentiality and Mediator
Recommendations

If the parties fail to come to a resolution in mediation, a judge
will hear their case and decide the outcome. During California's early
mediation programs in the 1970s, there emerged two different practices and philosophies of the courts: the "confidential" model and the
"recommending" or "evaluative" model.9 7 The confidential model
prohibits the mediator from making any recommendation to the
court as to the preferred outcome of any unresolved issues.98 Rather,
the mediator must only submit to the court a list of the remaining
issues to be addressed. 99 In contrast, under the recommending model,
mediators may be asked by the court to make recommendations on
the unresolved issues. I""In jurisdictions that use the recommending
model, the mediator has a duty to tell the parties prior to mediation
that the mediator may occupy the role of both mediator and evaluator.I" I Today, California gives local courts the discretion to use either
of these models-the applicable statute specifically authorizes
mediators to submit recommendations to the court as to the custody
of or visitation with the child, if local court rules so provide. 112
Two problems arise in the recommending model from allowing a
mediator to switch from a position of confidential neutrality to that of
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.

Ricci, supra note 16, at 4, 21.
See id. at 23.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See CAL. FAm. CODE § 3183(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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an evaluative-recommender. First, it undermines the parties' critical
trust and confidence in the so-called "neutrality" of the mediator. 0 3
Second, it allows the batterer further opportunity to manipulate the
mediator to ultimately gain an advantageous outcome. As one mediation expert noted, "Using the informal, consensual process of mediation, with no evidentiary or procedural rules, as the basis for an
imposed decision . . . create[s] a considerable risk that the more

clever or sophisticated participant may distort or manipulate the mediation in order to influence the mediator's opinion." 10

4

These

problems are especially worrisome in the context of domestic violence
because of the relationship and characteristics of the batterer and the
abused.
A battered woman is in a unique position of disadvantage under
the recommending model because of the particular psychological dynamic between her and her abuser. The abuser has a Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde personality where he comes across as charming and kind to
outsiders, but is actually extremely manipulative.l' 5 One commentator
explains, "Batterers are extraordinarily talented in sucking in therapists [and] the community .... Their whole M.O. is manipulation.
They are notorious liars; they'll say whatever makes them look good.
Even if the woman gets a restraining order ...

these guys will call or

send flowers."' 1 6 Considering batterers' adeptness and skill at deceiving everyone, including trained therapists, it is not far-fetched to imagine that an evaluative mediator might construe the abuser in a
favorable light, as highly positive and cooperative. Moreover,
"[b] atterers tend to deny their violence even to themselves, and go to
great lengths to conceal the violence from others if confronted."' 0 7 At
the same time, there is a risk the mediator will look unfavorably on
any reluctance to compromise on the part of the battered woman.
"[T]he abuser's willingness to share the children, which assures his
ongoing access to his partner and allows him to continue to manipu103. See generally Folberg, supra note 28 (discussing the importance of confidentiality in
mediation).
104. Id. at 333.
105. See BERRY, supra note 5, at 38; MCCUE, supra note 5, at 108.
106. Interview by Hara Estroff Marano with Sara Buel, Assistant District Attorney, Norfolk County, Va., in Wy They Stay: A Saga of Spouse Abuse, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May/June 1996,
at 57, 74.
107. Lerman, supra note 25, at 432; see also Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57,
57-59 (1984) (describing a case where the husband would not admit to any abuse, despite
having beaten his wife for over twenty-five years, including once pushing her through a
plate glass window).
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make him appear the more attractive

10 8
candidate for custody."
A related problem with the recommending model stems from the
decision in McLaughlin v. Superior Court.'19 In McLaughlin, the petitioner challenged the respondent court's mediation policy that allowed mediators to make a recommendation to the court but
prohibited their cross-examination by the parties. 0 The court held in
McLaughlin that the policy was unconstitutional as a violation of due
process, and directed that the respondent court only receive a recommendation from the mediator if the parties are guaranteed the rights
to have the mediator testify and to cross-examine him or her concerning the recommendation."' Thus, under the recommending model,
where the judge will rely on the mediator's recommendations in making a decision, a batterer can call the mediator to testify in the hearing. This extinguishes the confidentiality of the victim because any
private information that the victim shared with the mediator in the
supposedly confidential setting of her separate meetings is now at risk

of being revealed in court." 2 Conversely, if the batterer does not

choose to have the mediator testify, the victim can either accept the
recommendation of the mediator unchallenged, or call the mediator
to testify and be cross-examined, again undermining her
confidentiality.
The implications of McLaughlin are dangerous in the context of
domestic violence because it exacerbates the problem of confidentiality and creates a dilemma for battered women. It creates an inconsistency in legislation because according to section 3177, mediation
proceedings are to be confidential.1 Confidentiality is a central principle underlying the success of mediation. For battered women, the
erosion of confidentiality can be even more troublesome because it
means that whatever information about the batterer she has chosen to
disclose to the mediator is now discoverable by her abuser. One researcher explained, "It is well documented that thousands of battered
108. Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide:ProtectingBattered Parents and Their Children in
the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273, 277 (1999).
109. 189 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Ct. App. 1983).
110. See id. at 481.
111. See id. at 486-87. The parties may waive those rights. See id.
112. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3177, 3181 (West 1994).
113. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3177 ("Mediation proceedings ... shall be held in private
and shall be confidential. All communications, verbal or written, from the parties to the
mediator made in the proceeding are official information within the meaning of Section
1040 of the Evidence Code.").
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women tolerate beatings for years because they are threatened with
worse beatings if they talk about their problems or seek help."' 1 4 The
absence of confidentiality gives the abused woman incentive not to
disclose unfavorable or incriminating facts about her abuser. In a negotiation context with mediator recommendations, it is especially important that a victim speak freely about the abuse since she is the only
one advocating on her own behalf to a mediator who can shape the
outcome. The dilemma McLaughlin creates is that it traps a battered
woman into a no-win situation.' 5 She can either confide to the mediator about the abuse and threats and risk the batterer discovering that
she has tattled, or she can remain silent and risk that the mediator's
favorable impression of the batterer stands unchallenged. Thus, when
a court chooses to allow the mediator to make recommendations, it
creates a host of problems that have a great potential to work to the
disadvantage of domestic violence victims.
D.

Mandatory Mediation Undermines the Best Interests of the
Child

Under California's mandatory mediation legislation for custody
and visitation, the designated purpose and goal of mediation is to provide for the "best interest" of the child. 1 6 In determining the "best
interest" of the child, the applicable test relies on the assessment of
various factors, including "[t]he health, safety, and welfare of the
child," and "[a] ny history of abuse by one parent... against... [t] he
other parent."1 7 Nevertheless, this goal of mediation is thwarted in
the context of mandatory mediation involving domestic violence. By
forcing victims of domestic violence into mandatory mediation, the
child's best interest is not adequately protected because the mediation
process is non-accusatory and forward-looking, and is disadvantageous
to the battered woman, shifting the scales in favor of custody for the
batterer. Mediation allows a batterer who has not been held accounta114.
115.

Lerman, supra note 25, at 432.
See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 279 (1984).
116. CAL FAM. CODE § 3161 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). Section 3161 provides:
The purposes of a mediation proceeding is as follows:
(a) To reduce acrimony that may exist between the parties.
(b) To develop an agreement assuring the child close and continuing contact
with both parents that is in the best interest of the child, consistent with Sections

3011 and 3020.
(c) To effect a settlement of the issue of visitation rights of all parties that is in the
best interest of the child.
117. Id. § 3011(a)-(b).

TO
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ble for his behavior and who may not even be identified as an abuser
to simply sit down and freely negotiate with his victim for control of
the children. Giving a batterer such power is like giving a pyromaniac
a box of matches. Unfortunately, the children are the ones who get
burned if the batterer has unrestrained power to dictate their future.
The children are at the mercy of whatever the batterer decides will
help perpetuate his control. As he achieves the custody arrangement
that will best suit his abusive needs, there is no attorney, no judge, and
no therapist to intervene and demand what is best for the children. It
is in this sense that mandatory mediation is fundamentally contradictory and detrimentally inconsistent with legislation aiming to protect
the child.
Research illuminates the connection between domestic violence
and the resulting dangers to children that has only recently been uncovered, and the depth of its impact seems to know no limits.I" 8 Between 50 and 70% of men who abuse their female partners also abuse
their children, and when there are four or more kids, over 90% of
men who abuse their partners also abuse their children. ", Additionally, 25 to 33% of men who batter their wives also sexually abuse their
children. 121 Given the nature of mediation as disadvantageous for battered women, by allowing the batterer to enter mediation with a clean
slate and bargain for his rights to his children, the result contravenes
legislation purporting to protect the child. The danger is especially
high as shown by the observation that "husbands who batter their
wives are twice as likely to seek custody as non-abusive husbands, in
part because many batterers see it as a way to perpetuate control over
their ex-wives."' 2 1 Such "tangential spouse abuse" is illustrated by the
batterer's interest in custody as an extension of his control. 122 Abusers
frequently "use children as pawns in the power play against the
mother. Batterers use child visitation to gain access to the mother to
118. See generally Laurel A. Kent, Comment, Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on
Children: Alternatives to Laws Criminalizingthe Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presenceof a
Child, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1337, 1342-47 (2001) (noting the historical inattention paid to
children exposed to domestic violence and discussing the behavioral, emotional, cognitive,
physical, and social effects of domestic violence on children).
119.

See BERRY, supra note 5, at 8.

120. See id.
121. Catherine Elton, Why Courts Award Batterers Custody, in BATTERED WOMEN 87, 88
(Louise Gerdes ed., 1999).
122. Stark, supra note 70, at 1017 (explaining that the term "tangential spouse abuse"
describes the extension of coercive tactics to the children as part of an ongoing battering
relationship).
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terrorize her; they fight for custody to retaliate against the woman."'
Rather than holding batterers accountable for their actions or taking
into serious consideration. the. likelihood of. continuing danger,
mandatory mediation favors the batterer to emerge successful and
therefore jeopardizes the children's best interest.
Not only are the best interests of the child directly contradicted,
but the long term welfare of children and society is also thwarted. One
study found that 81% of abusive husbands and 33% of abused wives
came from violent family backgrounds. 124 In addition, "boys exposed
to fathers who batter their mothers are 700 times more likely to use
violence in their own lives." 125 If a boy is abused himself, he is 1000
times more likely to use violence than a boy who did not experience
abuse. 126 Mandatory mediation poses the grave risk of perpetuating
this cycle of violence by its potential to allow these patterns to continue unrestrained and unaccounted for. It gives the batterer the upper hand in negotiating for custody, and does not impose any kind of
court-ordered treatment for the batterer.
Lenore Walker notes that "children who live in a battering relationship experience the most insidious form of child abuse. Whether
or not they are physically abused by either parent is less important
than the psychological scars they bear from watching their fathers
beat their mothers."127 Another commentator notes, "Children who
witness domestic violence demonstrate the same symptoms as physically or sexually abused children."'128 Therefore, even if the abuser
never lays a hand on his own children, the best interests of the children are nevertheless thwarted because a parent's battering has and
will continue to have an enormous detrimental impact on the
children.

123.

BERRY,

supra note 5, at 153.

124.

See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Violent Family, in VIOLENCE
PLINARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 62 (Mary Lystad ed., 1986).
125. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Defense, in
(Louise Gerdes ed., 1999).
126.

See id.

127.

WALKER,

IN THE HOME: INTERDISCI-

BA-rrERED WOMEN 82,

86

supra note 52, at 149.
128. Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1995); see also Lynne R. Kurtz, Comment, ProtectingNew York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption
Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1350-52 (1997)
(discussing other research and studies that have focused on the effects of domestic violence on women and children).
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Stifling the Screams of Progress: The Privatization of Domestic
Violence Through Mediation

Allowing victims of domestic violence to pursue adjudication
rather than mediation is essential. On a practical level, battered women are in a disadvantaged position from the moment the State
forces them to sit down at the bargaining table and negotiate with
their abusers. Research has found that battered women are more
likely to be abused after mediation than after a formal trial. 129 In addition, studies have shown that the money saved by choosing mediation
may be illusory.t"
On an ideological level, battered women individually and as a
group are ultimately disadvantaged by mandatory mediation because
it stifles the progress of domestic violence issues and does nothing to
empower or vindicate the victims in the long term. In mediation, "the
emphasis is not on who is right or who is wrong."'" 1 "Mediation is
more concerned with how the parties will resolve the conflict and create a plan than with personal histories." 132 Mediation does not care
about attaching blame; it just looks to future solutions. Thus, mediation not only assures that the abuser's actions will go unpunished and
unaccounted for, it also perpetuates tite privatization of a problem
that has traditionally been kept out of the public consciousness. 133 Fittingly, proponents of mediation note that mediation is not "strictly
governed by precedent nor concerned with the precedent [it] may set
for others," and "private matters may be discussed without becoming
1 4
part of a public record."'
The danger of taking a serious social problem like domestic violence out of public discourse and hiding it in the corners of mediation
rooms is that it minimizes the importance of the problem and operates as a setback to the movements of the 1970s that brought the pri129. See Fischer et al., supra note 49, at 2153; Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 252 (stating that more than
40% of men studied resumed their abusive behavior within four and a half months of
completing mediation).
130. See Imbrogno, supra note 6, at 867 (noting also that "[t]he potential long-term
financial losses confronting women who [mediate] can greatly outweigh short-term savings
in legal fees and court costs").
131. Folberg, supra note 21, at 16.
132. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 8.
133. See generally Imbrogno, supra note 6 (contrasting the battered women's movement
that brought public awareness to domestic violence with the subsequent reprivatization
through mediation).
134. Folberg, supra note 21, at 16.
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vate family problem of abuse into public scrutiny. 135 One critic
cautions that "the privatization of domestic violence through mediation can . ..diminish [ ] the judicial development and vindication of
legal rights for disadvantaged groups such as battered women." 136 A
mandatory mediation policy, with no exemptions for battered women,
gives the State imprimatur to treat domestic violence as a peripheral
issue that is not important enough to justify spending precious court
time or money in remedying. One commentator remarked:
When public matters are funneled into [mediation], the American
people lose, among other things, the opportunity to vindicate and
develop the legal rights of the oppressed. But most importantly, it
is American society itself that must bear the burden of knowing
those segthat it and its institutions are turning their backs on
37
ments of the population most in need of protection.'

While not everyone will want to pursue litigation or even be able
to afford it, to take away that option is disempowering to victims and
stifling to the progress of the battered women's movement. Victims
should be encouraged to bring issues of domestic violence out into
the public forum if that is their choice. When the patriarchal State
forces the privatization of domestic violence through mandatory mediation, it takes away the progress and power that is gained through
public scrutiny and discourse.

I1. Solutions
A.

Restoring Power Through Optional Exemption

California has a responsibility to reform its mandatory mediation
in cases of domestic violence in order to protect individual victims,
and to fulfill the socially responsible mission of visibly empowering the
collective plight of battered women. The fundamental change that
California should make in reformulating its legislation is to provide
for optional exemptions to mandatory mediation, allowing victims to
decide for themselves if they want to mediate or formally adjudicate.
This will enable battered women to avoid the potential dangers and
unfairness inherent in mediation, as well as empower victims with the
decision to control their destiny either through a public forum or
135. See generally Imbrogno, supra note 6 (discussing the dangers of reprivatization of
domestic violence through mediation).
136. Imbrogno, supra note 6, at 872; see also Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986) ("Imagine, for example, the
impoverished nature of civil rights law that would have resulted had all race discrimination
cases in the sixties and seventies been mediated rather than adjudicated.").
137. Imbrogno, supra note 6, at 879.
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through a private one. These modifications will still allow the State to
fulfill its cost-effective goals by continuing mediation in cases where
victims choose to settle privately.,
1. The Choice to Mediate
It is vital that California allow a victim of domestic violence the
option to adjudicate instead of mediate. To give choices to battered
women is empowering, while to deny choices is to strip victims of true
self-determination and vindication of their legal rights. The state
should not restrict the use of the public forum because it is an important avenue to foster awareness and social change. While not every
battered woman will choose litigation, the choice should be the victim's to make. Battered women have been silenced long enough, and
the state should not force them to remain hidden and fend for themselves in mediation.
In implementing a self-determining policy, California should
model itself after Hawaii's mediation statute. 3 8 Like California, Hawaii maintains a mandatory mediation policy, but unlike California,
Hawaii allows an exemption for spousal abuse.'I ' Moreover, the statute provides that in the case of domestic violence, mediation shall not
proceed unless "authorized by the victim of the alleged family violence."''4 While this provision does not safeguard against the concerns of possible coercion by the batterer or the victim's psychological
state of denial, it does fill an essential need for autonomy and empowerment for the battered woman. At a minimum, California should emulate Hawaii's legislation in this regard, and also seek measures to
address potential safety issues.14
2.

Providing a Broad-Based Exemption Policy

In providing exemptions for mandatory mediation, California
should reformulate its legislation to mirror North Carolina's ap138. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5(a)-(b)(1) (Supp. 2001).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Although Hawaii's approach provides for full empowerment to a battered woman
by allowing her equal access to either forum, there is a risk in giving unfettered discretion
to a victim who is suffering from a severe degree of emotional paralysis or has been
threatened by her spouse. The best way to address this potential risk, while still offering the
choice of two avenues, is to formally address her decision in pre-mediation therapeutic
intervention. See discussion infra Part III.D. This will allow a trained therapist to evaluate
the emotional state of the victim, assess the existence and extent of external pressures
forcing her to choose mediation, and provide corresponding treatment and advice.
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proach, which provides for a waiver of mediation on a showing of
good cause. 142 North Carolina's waiver requirement is most favorable
to victims of domestic violence because it allows good cause to be
shown by "allegations of abuse or neglect of the minor child; allegations of alcoholism, drug abuse, or spouse abuse; or allegations of se1 43
vere psychological, psychiatric, or emotional problems."
By allowing exemptions based upon a broad variety of showings,
North Carolina's legislation eliminates the dangers inherent in forced
mediation and gives a battered woman many opportunities to avoid a
process that may not be in her best interests. One significant aspect of
North Carolina's legislation is that in providing for exemptions, it
takes into account the frequent connection between domestic violence and a broad range of other behaviors. For example, a woman
can avoid mediation on a mere allegation of alcoholism.1 44 This is
important because of the strong connection between alcohol and
spousal abuse. A significant predictor of domestic violence is alcohol, 14 5 and one study found that as many as 93% of men committing
violence. on their wives were alcoholics. 146 A battered woman in North
Carolina who does not want to mediate and does not want to allege
any violence has the choice of alleging alcoholism to be exempted.
North Carolina's policy also allows a victim to be exempt from
mediation upon allegations of drug abuse.1 4 7 Like alcoholism, there is
a demonstrated connection between drug abuse and domestic violence. One study found that 64% of all reported child abuse and neglect cases in New York City were associated with drug or alcohol
abuse.' 48 Again, North Carolina's legislation favors victims because it
recognizes these connections, and gives battered women a better
chance to escape mediation. If she denies or minimizes her abuse, or
is afraid to come forward with direct allegations, either to protect herself or her children, she has the alternative to make true allegations of
drug or alcohol abuse under the North Carolina legislation.
142.
143.
144.

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (c)(2001).
Id.
See id.

145. See LIFERING, UNHOOKED SCIENCE READINGS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & ALCOHOL AND
OTHER DRUcS, at http://www.unhooked.com/sep/alcodome.htm (last accessed Aug. 9,
2003).
146. SeeJerry P. Flanzer, Alcohol Abuse Causes Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 54, 60 (Tamara L. Roleff ed., 2000).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c).
148. See LIFERING, supra note 145.
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Eliminating Mediator Discretion and the Recommendation
Model

1. Abrogating Mediator Discretion to Exclude Support Person
Another necessary modification to California's legislation is to
eliminate the total discretion afforded to the mediator. Under section
3182, the mediator has unchallengeable authority to exclude counsel
as well as a "domestic violence support person" from a mediation proceeding.149 It is plausible that part of the reason a battered woman is
even willing to mediate is because she knows she is not alone and has
the support of an advocate or a friend, and the State should not allow
mediators to take away that source of strength and security from her.
This importance has been highlighted:
Those who work with battered women have discovered that if the
victim has someone with her for moral support during any proceeding, she gains courage to confront the situation and ask for
what she wants. The presence of others may interfere somewhat
with the process of mediation, but without such assistance,
the re5
sulting agreement may not reflect her concerns.1 0
Therefore, instead of having complete mediator discretion, California should follow Hawaii's mediation policy, which provides that
the victim can bring a support person whose presence cannot be challenged by anyone.' 5' This will help to empower the battered woman,
give her a steady sense of control and confidence in the process, and
foster a balanced bargaining table for negotiations.
2.

Eliminating the Recommendation Model and the Related
McLaughlin Dilemma

Another critical legislative change needed is to prohibit the use
of a recommendation model altogether in cases involving domestic
violence. This will solve the McLaughlin predicament by making complete confidentiality a staple of the mediation process. Legislation
purporting to safeguard the confidentiality of the proceedings1

52

is

undermined when, as in the McLaughlin case, the mediator is allowed
to give recommendations to the court and is subject to cross-examination. 153 California should strive to uphold the principles of confidentiality in mediation and the neutrality of the mediator by mandating the
149. CAL, FAM. CODE § 3182 (West 1994).
150. Lerman, supra note 25, at 434.
151. See HAW. REv. SrAT. § 58041.5 (d)(3) (Supp. 2001).
152. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3177 ("Mediation proceedings ..
and shall be confidential."); see also discussion supra Part I1.C.
153. See 189 Cal. Rptr. 479, 486-87 (Ct. App. 1983).

shall be held in private
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confidential model and preventing the mediator from making any
recommendations to the court. 15 4 This will also alleviate the problems
of the victim's nondisclosure of abuse, the batterer's manipulation,
and the potential for an unfair outcome because the victim will be less
fearful of discussing her abuse during mediation, and the batterer's
cooperativeness and the victim's uncooperativeness at the mediation
will not transfer to and adversely affect the victim in court
proceedings.
C.

Comprehensive Pre-Mediation Screening Procedures to Identify
Domestic Violence

California needs to establish comprehensive procedures to guarantee that victims of domestic violence are immediately identified
before the start of mediation. Among the states employing mediation,
there has been a lack of sufficient attention given to this part of the
process.1 55 A recent study found that not all states even screen for
domestic violence, and among the ones that do, typically by written or
oral questions, the average number of questions related to domestic
violence is only 3.5.156 If California continues to promote mediation,

the implementation of adequate screening is especially crucial so that
victims are not lost in the system. Once identified victims can be
properly channeled to therapeutic intervention where they can safely
consider whether mediation is in their best interest.
To achieve a more complete system, California should first
change its legislation to require that cases only proceed if there has
been a properly reviewed intake form as part of an adequate screening procedure. Further, California should require courts to adopt a
screening procedure that consists of more than just a short intake
form or other basic questionnaire. "[S]imply asking whether a party
has abused, or been abused, is not likely to elicit an accurate response.
Screening tools administered in a perfunctory manner may fail to uncover abuse."15 7 Comparing the options of background checks,
clinical observations, written questionnaires, and in-person interviews,
the in-person separate interview is considered most effective because
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.
155. See generally Alexandria Zyistra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A PracticalScreening
Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. Disp. REsOL. 253 (2001)
(discussing pre-mediation measures utilized by states).
156. See id. at 253.
157. Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screeningfor Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 43, 62 (1995).
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it enables a hesitant victim to more easily reveal abuse, even if indi58
rectly by her nonverbal cues.'
Given the propensity for a battered woman to minimize or altogether deny her abuse, it is necessary that trained personnel conduct
these interviews with proper attention to the subtleties and implications of the victim's responses. "Secrecy and distortions shroud the
complex dynamics of domestic violence. Therefore, a screener should
not minimize any disclosure, even an isolated incident, of abusive behavior."' 159 While the questions should include explicit inquiries about
specific instances of physical, psychological, sexual, and other abuse,
the interviewer should also look for behavioral and nonverbal cues of
violence and victimization.'

6

1

This will ensure that the victims do not

slip through the cracks, and it places the burden to take account for
domestic violence on the State rather than the victims, who may be
stifled in their ability to come forward.
Another objective of the screening process is to identify the victims who are most vulnerable to the dangers of mediation. Although
not an easy task, screeners should try to distinguish at-risk victims
among the spectrum defined by the particular relationship and the
extent and severity of the abuse. For instance, victims whose experiences most closely identify with the "culture of battering," the "cycle
of violence," and the resulting psychological stresses and external
pressures, are most at risk. 16 1 One type of comprehensive screening
procedure that takes into account all of the aforementioned considerations is the "Conflict Assessment Protocol."' 6 2 This approach is designed to identify spousal abuse and assess the appropriateness of
mediation through a lengthy initial interview and follow-up questions. 16"- The structure of the inquiry includes both specific questions
regarding abuse, as well as open-ended, non-violence-oriented questions used to assess decision-making routines and other control issues
between the couple. 16 4 California should adopt a modified version of
this scheme, and, in accordance with the spectrum of at-risk candidates, divide the couples into two categories: those likely to benefit
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Zylstra, supra note 155, at 271.
Gerencser, supra note 157, at 60.
See Zylstra, supra note 155, at 271.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
Zylstra, supra note 155, at 272.

163.
164.

See id.
See id.
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from standard mediation and those likely to be harmed by
mediation 165
Under the Conflict Assessment Protocol, the first category includes the cases with no control or abuse indicators, minimal emotional abuse such as name-calling or put-downs unassociated with a
pattern of control, and cases with one or two isolated incidents of
physical confrontation that do not create a controlling pattern. 16 6
These are the cases that are likely to benefit from mediation. 6 7 The
second category includes cases that are recommended to be excluded
from mediation. These cases include those where: 1) one or both parties are unable to negotiate, and there are indicators of potential serious injury or death to one party, 2) the abuser continues to have a
need to control the abused spouse, 3) the abuser accepts no responsibility for the violence, and 4) the abuser has recently or plans to obtain a weapon or has been convicted of a violent crime, or the abuser
has suicidal or violent fantasies. 168 Additionally, a case should be excluded from mediation when the victim does not want the batterer to
know she has disclosed the abuse. 169 In adopting these screening procedures, California will be implementing the safeguards necessary to
provide a safe and equitable mediation process for battered women
and their children.
D.

Pre-Mediation Therapeutic Intervention

One mediator described a couple in a typical divorce mediation
that involved no violence: "They are beyond logic, caught in an emotional trap. The mediator must free them, encourage them to begin
thinking like adults again. But they have to see it for themselves. You
can't force them to be rational."'' 71 The mediator's task may be difficult in a violence-free relationship, but the burden of the mediator is
significantly more daunting in a mediation involving domestic violence because of the complexities and intense psychological dynamics
found in an abusive relationship. To respond, California should implement a mandatory form of therapeutic intervention for both the
batterer and the victim to occur before and concurrent with any medi165.

Cf id. at 274 (adding the possibility of a third category).

166.
167.
168.
169.

See
See
See
See

170.

ROBERT COULSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: MANAGING CONFLICr, RESOLVING DISPUTES

id.
id.
id.
id.

67 (2d ed. 1996).
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ation. 71 This measure would be an extension of existing orientation
and parent education programs that occur prior to mediation in many
California mediation programs and aim to prepare the parties for negotiation. 72 In the short-term, the therapy will help facilitate a more
fair mediation process for the battered woman and help ensure the
future safety of the children. It will be beneficial in the long-term as a
socially responsible program that addresses the problems of domestic
violence at the outset of dispute resolution rather than stuffing these
issues away in the corners of mediation rooms.
1. Treatment for the Victim
Once a comprehensive intake process determines that there may
be issues of abuse present in the relationship, each party should be
immediately referred to a trained therapist who has experience in domestic violence. For the victim, the therapist's purpose should be twofold. In order to help decide whether mediation is in the victim's best
interest, the first objective of the therapist should be to evaluate and
assess the level of abuse, the victim's current psychological state, and
the existence and likelihood of retaliation or threats from the batterer. The second duty should be to address and help overcome the
particular emotional problems and cognitive processes that prevent
the battered woman from bargaining and asserting herself on an
equal playing field in mediation.
Domestic violence expert Lenore Walker described how the process of victimization is perpetuated to the point of psychological paralysis, and stressed that "battered women need to be taught to change
their failure expectancy to reverse a negative cognitive set. They need
to understand what success is, to raise their motivation and aspiration
171. This would be an extension of the court's current discretionary power to order
counseling under CAL. FAM. CODE § 3190 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002):
(a) The court may require parents or any other party involved in a custody or
visitation dispute, and the minor child, to participate in outpatient counseling...
if the court finds both of the following:
(1) The dispute between the parents, between the parent or parents and the
child ... poses a substantial danger to the best interest of the child.
(2) The counseling is in the best interest of the child.
The underlying premise of mandatory therapeutic intervention is that whenever there is a
significant history of domestic violence, it is always in the child's best interest for the court
to require the abuser and victim to attend therapy.
172. See Ricci, supra note 16, at 16-17. However, these programs are not uniform. See
id. at 46 n.J 3 (stating that 87% of California mediation programs reported that parent
education programs are provided to mediation clients through the court or an outside
agency contracted with the court).
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levels, [and] be able to initiate new and more effective responses, so
they can learn to control their own lives. ' 173 Given the particular psychological disadvantages of a battered woman and the problematic
nature of mediation, it is vital that an empowering therapeutic process
occur before and concurrent with any mediation to ensure that a battered woman is participating in a fair process that equalizes power
imbalances. California must at least give her these tools to succeed at
the bargaining table.
A cost-effective way for California to implement these measures is
to use a combination of individual and group therapy. Walker has
documented the effectiveness of group therapy. 174 "Women describe
having derived a sense of strength from all of the other group members that is more difficult to provide on an individual basis."' 175 She
further reports that in one group setting, battered women are taught
to use the criminal justice system "to help [them] overcome the immobilization that their terror brings. As women witness other women
successfully making changes, they themselves are more likely to
change. ' 17 6 Such an approach will accomplish the dual purpose of
empowering women during the negotiation and enabling them to
hold their batterers accountable in a socially visible way.
2.

177
Treatment for the Batterer

The primary objective of therapy for the batterer is to help ensure the safety of the victim and the children throughout the mediation process. The secondary objective is to facilitate such safety and
promote the best interest of the children in the long term. These
goals are important to promote a fair mediation process, are consistent with California's legislation purporting to protect the best interest of the child, and hold the batterer accountable for his behavior. As
one commentator stated regarding the best interest of the child:
While batterers do need to be held accountable for their criminal
behavior in order to address the trauma experienced by children,
batterers also need to be educated concerning how their children
are impacted by their violent behavior.
173.

WALKER, supra note 52, at 53-54.
174. See id. at 240-44.
175. Id. at 240..
176. Id. at 241.
177. In Louisiana, if a parent has a history of family violence, supervised visitation is
allowed only if the parent has participated in and completed a treatment program, and
there are stricter standards for unsupervised visitation. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364
(West '1991). Louisiana's statute is a significant development among states in addressing
the effects of domestic violence on children.
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Domestic violence is a behavior pattern that is justified in the batterer's mind by a system of beliefs .... [T]his
sort of education is
78
extremely important to a child's welfare.'
Given these objectives, the treatment should focus primarily on
two tasks. First, treatment should use a comprehensive approach to
help the batterer change his abusive behavior and learn to negotiate
and compromise fairly.17 ' Second, it should continually assess the potential likelihood of danger that the batterer may retaliate, kidnap, or
otherwise jeopardize the safety of the woman and children. The importance of keeping tabs on the batterer's violent potential cannot be
understated. "The most dangerous time for a battered woman is when
she separates from her partner. Many attacks are precipitated in retaliation for her leaving, some as part of an escalation of violence follow-

ing separation."'' 80 One study found that of all women killed by their
husbands, 47% of them were killed within two months of separating,
and 91% were killed within a year of separating.' 8 ' Moreover, every
hour 40.4 children are abducted in this country-mostly by fathers or
their agents-and more than half of these abductions occur in the
context of domestic violence. 8 2 Needless to say, "[c]ustodial interference is one of the few battering tactics available to an abuser after
separation; thus, it is not surprising that it is used extensively.""8 "
The most helpful and cost-effective treatment for batterers comes
from group therapy.'8 4 According to research, 70% of men sent to
178. Kent, supra note 118, at 1356-57.
179. In discussing the scope of treatment needed to break batterers' thinking patterns
and behaviors, one commentator noted:
Court-ordered treatment programs for batterers seek to do all of the following:
increase the batterer's responsibility for his abusive behavior; help the batterer
develop behavioral alternatives to battering; increase the batterer's constructive
expression of emotions, listening skills, and anger control; decrease isolation and
develop personal support systems; decrease dependency on and control of the
relationship; and increase the batterer's understanding of the family and social
facilitators of domestic violence.
Kent, supra note 118, at 1360; see also Leslie D. Johnson, Comment, Caught in the Crossfire:
Examining Legislative andJudicial Response to the Forgotten Victims of Domestic Violence, 22 LAw &
PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 277-80 (1998) (discussing batterers' programs).
180. Fischer et al., supra note 49, at 2138-39.
181. See SAFE HORIZON, DOMElSTIC VIOLENCE FACTS: THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, at http://
www.dvsheltertour.org/fact.html#cycle (last accessed Aug. 9, 2003).
182. See BARBARAJ. HART, MINNESOTA CENTER AGAINST VIOLEN:E AND ABUSE, CHILDREN
OF DOMESriC: VIOLENCE:

RISKS AND

REMEDIES,

at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/

risks&r.htm (last accessed Aug. 9, 2003).
183. Id.
184. See generally Hara Estroff Marano, From Battered Woman to Advocate, in BArrERED
WOMEN 121, 128 (Louise Gerdes ed., 1999) (adding that mandatory group treatment programs for batterers should last at least one year).
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such batterers programs did not physically abuse their partners during
a twelve-month follow up period, and the men who were mandated to
attend the programs were less likely to become abusive than the men
who came voluntarily.18 5 In group therapy, "[t]he emphasis is on trying to get batterers to accept responsibility for the violence without
blaming their partners and changing the attitudes of batterers so that
they no longer see violence as an acceptable response in any situation."'18 6 Furthermore, in a group setting the therapy focuses on discussing ways in which "batterers wield power and control, through
emotional as well as physical abuse," and "allows batterers to confront
one another regarding their tendency to minimize, deny and distort
their abuse."'1 8 7 The group therapy also teaches anger management
and communication skills.' 8 8 This kind of program can help establish
an intimidation- and violence-free mediation process, and can help
ensure that in both the short and long term, the best interests of victims and their children are promoted.
Conclusion
California's mandatory mediation legislation currently fails to
recognize and address the complexity of domestic violence and the
dangerous implications that arise in the context of mediation in a battering relationship. In failing to understand the scope of the issues,
California takes a pervasive and multi-dimensional problem out of
public discourse and scrutiny, creating a dangerous setback in the
plight of victims of domestic violence. It also disempowers and jeopardizes the welfare of individual victims and their children by forcing
them to participate in a negotiation process that is structured to favor
a batterer. California needs to fundamentally restructure its mediation
laws, with the first and most important step to join other states in allowing optional exemptions for victims of domestic violence. It is also
essential to reform the mediation process by eliminating mediator discretion and recommendations to assure confidentiality. Furthermore,
California should develop comprehensive pre-mediation screening
procedures and implement a form of therapeutic intervention for
185.

See Craig Chalquist, Therapy Programsfor Batterers Are Effective at Reducing Domestic

Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 142, 145 (Tamara L. Roleff ed.,

2000).
186.

JOHN M. Go-rMAN & NEIL S. JACOBSON, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS

INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 232 (Simon & Schuster 1998).

187.
188.

Id.
See DuTroN, supra note 96, at 179.
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both batterers and victims. With an explicit recognition and understanding of the scope and dimensions of domestic violence, California
can successfully promote the rights of all battered women, and use
legislation as a tool to ultimately restore power to victims.

